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1 Introduction

Since Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) influential cleavage theory, where a national party system is composed according to its underlying social conflicts developed in the 1920s, various authors such as Hooghe and Marks (2017) and Caramani (2017) dealt with new conflicts, and new challenges which influence the current democratic party system.

More specified, Hooghe and Marks (2017) state that a new cleavage developed in Europe. Based on the assumption common to cleavage theory where change happens discontinuously in the national party systems and is influenced by external shocks, they see the euro crisis and immigration crisis, if not the European Union (EU) itself, as such shocks and therefore critical junctures in the development of the transnational cleavage. This new conflict line gave rise to populist parties. Caramani (2017) on the other hand points to the general critiques raised towards party government not only by populists but also technocrats in Europe. Both propose an "alternative form of political representation" to party government, as such questioning party government per se.

Starting from the question *How do the populist and technocratic critiques of party government relate to the transnational cleavage*?, I will argue that populism critique, as well as technocratic critique, are reflected in the problems raised by the transnational cleavage. The former, however, can use the cleavage to push their principles of representation while the latter reinforces the problems articulated in the cleavage.

Doing this, I will focus on the differences between the two forms of representation since they are the key to the populist advantage, and close the essay with a conclusion. But first, I will shortly present the transnational cleavage and the two critiques.

2   A new conflict, a party system's response and two alternatives

In the context of globalization, the progress of supra- and transnational entities, and the problems arising with them, Hooghe and Marks (2017) propose a new transnational cleavage. The EU and the associated euro and immigration crises are essential to its development, being external shocks and critical junctures within the national party systems. Not surprisingly this cleavage embodies the "[…] the defense of national political, social and economic ways of life against external actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods or exerting rule." (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 2), and confronts *libertarian, universalistic values* with the *defense of nationalism and particularism* (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 15). This cultural conflict is mobilized by populist movements and consequently, (radical) right-wing, and left-wing populist parties are able to emerge in different parts of Europe[1].

In the meantime, the established parties remain "sticky" and inflexible in their programs, not able to respond to a new major conflict stressed by the two crises. In the need to appeal to their constituencies, their response to such shocks is, if at all, rather slow and singularly to an issue, not an entire conflict (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 4–5, 10–17). This reaction of established parties is consistent with one of the distinct features of party government mentioned by Caramani (2017, 55–57, 63), where various parties provide options for different core constituencies over which they compete and to whom they mainly respond.

However, radical transformations such as *economic globalization* or *nonstate character of governance* are the basis not only for the populist critique of party government, but also for the technocratic critique (Caramani 2017, 54). Besides, both critiques perceive society's general interest as *unitary*, the society itself as *nonpluralist*, and as a result of this their relationship towards the people *unmediated* and *unaccountable* (Caramani 2017, 60–61). Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that both critiques are questioning political representation through parties per se and are in essence *antipolitical* (Caramani 2017, 55, 60). Yet, it is the populism's critique of party government and the principles they propose for political representation which match the problems articulated by the transnational cleavage. The reason lies in their differences of proposals for political representation.

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[1] Whether a right-wing party, a left-wing party or both emerged in a country depends on the context of the respective country and how they were challenged by and in the aftermath of the two crises (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 15–17).

2.1 Responsiveness over Responsibility: Populist gain and Technocratic loss

The populist critique differentiates itself sharply from the technocratic by the way how the aforementioned unitary interest of society should be articulated. Populists claim to identify the general interest from the "will of the people", and hence are legitimized through this. Contrary to the established parties, they act not for the state and are not influenced by transnational entities, but are responsive to the people who they are supposed to represent (Caramani 2017, 57–58, 61–63). This criticism is mirrored in the transnational cleavage. Although the parties are unresponsive to the conflict due to their stickiness to constituencies, populists can still use this unresponsiveness to criticize party government, while presenting themselves as the ones, who identify the interest of the people.

Furthermore, the EU is the perfect example of a transnational entity which seems to disregard national authority and exercises foreign rule in the respective national state (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 1–2). In addition, the EU adds more complexity and less transparency to governance, letting the citizens feel alienated from the decision makers (Kriesi 2014, 360–365), which is also the content of populism's "critique of governance" (Caramani 2017, 58).

Conversely, for the technocratic critique, this rising complexity is not a reason to step back and involve the people more in decision making, but a reason for experts to take over. They derive their legitimacy by their better education and claim of expertise in comparison to the common people and consequently act for the people in the sense of a full trustee model[2] (Caramani 2017, 58, 62). Sticky parties are not a problem anymore since the flaw of the party systems - according to the technocratic critique - is anyway exactly their engagement in merely gaining elections by making only short-term irresponsible decisions to appeal to their constituencies.

Good governance and efficiency are the key here and responsiveness is traded off for responsibility[3]. The unitary interest is, thus, identified rationally through scientific procedures with the claim "to act in the best interest of society" (Caramani 2017, 62). These principles raised by the technocratic critique, however, carve a deeper trench in the transnational cleavage,

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[2] Caramani (2017, 56–57) distinguishes here two models of how one can act on behalf of the people. One is the *delegate model*, where "representatives act on grounds of a mandate on the part of the constituents", the other the *trustee model*, where "representatives act independently from a mandate", classifying the party government as a weaker variant of the delegate model.

[3] Govern responsibly, or responsibility is used here in line with Caramani (2017, 56) in the sense of 'making good decisions', in view to their long-term consequences. Party government should ideally do both, govern responsively and responsibly.

where the highly educated people with more "mobile assets" already tend to be pro open borders, pro EU and participate within the global elite. Meanwhile, the less educated and "losers" of economic globalization feel that their only left assets such as national values and citizenship are endangered by transnationalism, which was supposed to be a gain for all (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 6-8).

Asserting that technocratic solution is more efficient and responsible does not help the technocratic critique, although in the provision of public goods, for example, efficiency is supposed to be achieved by multi-level governance like the EU. Especially with the euro crisis and the attempt to resolve it beyond public pressure by treaty modifications and technocratic institutions like the European Central Bank, people were still left in one way or another with resentment (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 7, 9). This resentment can be directed towards technocratic institutions such as the EU and her failures, giving space for the populist critique of them being unresponsive to the people, while leaving the technocratic principles' of government as being part of the problem.

To illustrate this, one can look at the Brexit referendum which is depicted as a consequence of the euro and immigration crisis and is an expression of the transnational cleavage outside of the party system due to high barriers for new parties within it (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 2, 17). The debates of this referendum circled around the goal of retrieving "British sovereignty" from the "technocrats in Brussels" (Tharoor 2017). This does not mean that the populism critique of the party government is truer, but in terms of the transnational cleavage it is clearly at an advantage, while the "'democratic deficit' of the European Union" can be attributed to the technocratic perception of non-involvement of the majority population (Caramani 2017, 64).

Important to understand is that populists manage to represent themselves descriptively as being one of the "common men". Despite the fact that with charismatic and unquestioned leaders who identify people's will, the populist form is de facto elitist and hence a trustee model, no less than the technocratic version. However, contrary to the technocratic critique, populism mobilizes votes and seeks consent from the people (Caramani 2017, 61-63).

A part in these developments also plays mediatization, which by putting parties on the spot, increases their need to act in short-term perspectives in order to appease their voters (Caramani 2017, 59). While according to the technocratic critique this development is part of the decline of responsibility, it adds to the explanation why established parties have troubles to change their programs entirely, when a new enduring conflict arises. At the same time, populist critique derives more use of mediatization. On one hand it criticizes leaders "monopolizing the agenda" and calls for "politicization beyond, outside, and in- dependently of partisan cannels", on the

other, it uses the media to voice new issues not advocated by the mainstream parties (Caramani 2017, 59). The strategy of communication relies then on emotionality, irrationality, and symbolism, appealing directly to nationalistic and ethnocultural sentiment, which is at the core of the issues raised in the new transitional cleavage.

Admittedly, to use these techniques of symbolism, appealing to nationalism and feelings of unity, people still need to be socialized in this manner (Caramani 2017, 62–63). This however is possible, as studies show that attitudes, such as associated with support for right-wing extremism, can go back to early childhood, are related to a parent's vote preferences, and one's educational level (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 20). Hence, the potential for socialization in the sense of populist critique is present and bears fruits in the articulation of problems within the transnational cleavage.

3 Conclusion

To sum up, for a cleavage in general, you need a coherent program of issues to address and gain a reputation from this program (Hooghe and Marks 2017, 15). In this sense, populism principles derived from their critique of party government manages to gain a reputation from the transnational cleavage. Issues addressed in this cleavage like fear of nationalism's dissolution, economic losses, and unresponsiveness of the established party system – apparently all because of the EU – are easily compatible with the populism critique of party government and their claim of being responsive to the will of the people. Canovan (1999, 6) puts it in a nutshell, writing that the EU is a "sitting duck" for populists. The technocratic critique on the other hand - albeit their goal of efficiency and responsibility - accentuate a reign by experts without the involvement of common people, strengthening the sentiment of not being heard by the established party government and the foreign technocrats in the EU. This, in turn, nurtures the critique issued by populists and reinforces the transnational cleavage.

I would not go as far as saying that technocratic critique is responsible for the cleavage, but it is astonishing how a cycle emerges where the technocratic critique presents itself as an advantage to the populist critique considering that in essence, both question party government completely and propose alternatives to it. As Caramani (2017, 64–65) concludes, so far both critiques remained within the boundaries of (liberal) party democracy and work through the institutions they criticize. Either as political parties themselves, as seen with the populist case, or as experts giving advise especially in the setting of the complex political governance at the transnational level. Both ways which we have also seen in the discussion of the transnational cleavage. Considering the above argument, however, the populist way is more fitting to the transnational cleavage and makes more use of it than the technocratic, getting closer to their version of an alternative to party government.

4   References

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